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Abstract
This paper approaches the problem of the ontology of the photographic image ‘post-digitalization’ historically, 
via a conception of photography as the historical totality of photographic forms. It argues, first, that photog-
raphy is not best understood as a particular art or medium, but rather in terms of the form of the image it 
produces; second, that the photographic image is the main social form of the digital image (the current his-
torically dominant form of the image in general); and third, that there is no fundamental ontological distinc-
tion regarding indexicality between photographically generated digital images and those of chemically based 
photography. ‘The anxiety about the real’ produced by digital imagery has its origins elsewhere, in the onto-
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between the ‘event of capture’ and the ‘event of visualization’, it is argued that it is in its potential for an 
infinite multiplication of visualizations that the distinctiveness of the digital image lies. In the digital image, 
the infinite possibilities for social exchange generated by the abstraction of value from use finds an equivalent 
visual form.
What does it mean to speak of photography from the standpoint of philosophy? The difficulty derives 
as much from the idea of a unitary philosophical standpoint – however abstract – as it does from the 
rapidly changing nature of the photographic, which now famously threatens any discourse about 
photographic ontology. Philosophy is riven from within by disagreements about its purported disci-
plinary autonomy, status and form, and hence its standpoint in relation to other fields of enquiry. It 
is split, in particular, by disagreements about the legitimacy of philosophizing beyond, even against, 
philosophy itself (Adorno 1967: 235); and these disagreements are necessarily reflected in different 
ways of philosophizing about ‘photography’. 
Suffice to say, in the 200-year dispute between those who attempt to separate out philosophy as 
the critical self-consciousness of reason from the experience of objects, and those who would conjoin 
them in the notion of the construction of a critical experience of objects, I side with the latter. To speak 
about photography from the standpoint of philosophy, from this point of view, it is also necessary to 
speak about philosophy from the standpoint of photography. That is to say, one cannot subtract the 
historical character of the image from the image of thought. At one time, it was considered useful to 
oppose the photographic image of thought of a reified Cartesian consciousness (by which objects are 
‘frozen’ into things in order to be made ‘available to science and practice as things for others’) to the 
filmic image of a dialectical thought (in which the details of individual moments of an object are sub-
jugated to the rhythm of the movement of thinking) – Adorno described Hegel’s dialectics as ‘films 
of thought’ (Adorno 1993: 100, 121). Yet today, with digital technologies of image production, this 
distinction is itself outmoded. The attempt to rethink the nature of the photographic image, post-
digitalization, has consequences for the reimaging of thought and hence for philosophy itself. It is 
also bound up with the concept of art, in its generic, post-medium form. In what follows, I approach 
the concept of photography and the notion of the photographic image at once historically, philo-
sophically and via their relations to the concept of art.
Photography, art, digitalization
It is a familiar feature of the history of the relationship between photography and art that it has at least 
as much to tell us about art, in general, and the consequences and limitations of particular conceptions 
of art, as it does about photography and its artistic possibilities and limitations. Indeed, if there is a 
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single practice in relation to which the development of the concept of art over the last 150 years is most 
often narrated, it is undoubtedly, I think, photography. By which I mean photography in its expanded 
(and still expanding) sense as the historical totality of photographic forms, or types of images produced in 
one way or another by the inscription of light: predominantly, until recently, chemical photography, of 
course, but also film, television, video and now – absolutely, I shall claim – digital photography, as well 
as photocopying and scanning, and even microwave imaging, infra-red, ultra-violet and short-wave 
radio imagery (Osborne 2003). Given this historical diversity of technologies, there is no more reason to 
privilege the chemical basis of traditional photographic image-creation in the delimitation of the param-
eters of the concept of photography than there would be to constrict the parameters of ‘painting’ by the 
chemical composition of pigments used during the Renaissance. Photography, like art, is a historical 
concept, subject to the interacting developments of technologies and cultural forms (that is to say, 
forms of recognition); increasingly, developments within photography, along with digital-based image 
production more generally, are driving the historical development of art. This is so not just reactively, as 
was initially mainly the case in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twen-
tieth century (in the transformation and internal retreat of other forms of representation), but affirma-
tively, in the use of photographic technologies to produce ‘art’ of a variety of kinds.
The question of the relationship of photography to art may thus be posed in two different ways: 
(1) synchronically or conjuncturally, at some specific time in their related histories (specifically, for us, 
now), and (2) diachronically, as a narrative question about the relationship between two histories: in 
terms of the possibility of some unitary narrative, which might contribute to the intelligibility of each. 
Both of these methods presuppose a position on the other. What is not helpful, I think, is to seek an 
answer to the question of the relationship between photography and art in general, as if they were not 
historical concepts, in the manner of an analytical philosophy of art. Nonetheless, the existence of a con-
stitutive historical dimension to these concepts does not mean that we need be positivists about history, 
and deny an ontological dimension to photography or indeed to art, or downgrade it to the status of 
what Jean-François Chevrier calls an ‘impoverished’ ontology (Rancière 2009: 12–13) – anymore that the 
existence of art institutions, socially delimiting the field of art, means that we need be positivists about 
institutional form. Rather, both photography and art can be meaningfully discussed within the discourse 
of historical ontology. This is the philosophical basis and field of the remarks that follow.
The photographic present is, clearly, digital. I shall thus address myself to the question, ‘What, if 
anything, does digitalization tell us about the nature of photography?’ and more specifically, ‘What 
does digitalization tell us about the nature of photography as a form of art?’ Please note, I say ‘form 
of art’ and not ‘medium’ because I wish to problematize (indeed, to reject) the assumption that what 
may legitimately be called ‘photography’ today displays the unity of a ‘medium’, in the sense adopted 
and developed by modernist formalism: namely, a specific combination of material means and con-
ventions governing practices of production. In the light of this, the critical-philosophical task would 
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be to update or redefine our conception of that medium under the changed technological conditions 
of ‘digitalization’. Certain photographic practices may exhibit such a unity, but, first, this unity is not 
that of the photographic tout court; and, second, more importantly, nor is it of any ontological sig-
nificance for the status of those practices as art – in the way in which, within modernist formalism 
and before, the art-status of a particular practice was taken to derive from its being an instance of a 
particular art – where ‘art’ is understood as the art of a particular medium. 
My thesis is that the photographic is not best understood as a particular art; it is currently the 
dominant form of the image in general. 
The problem with the concept of medium is that it mortgages discussion of the relationship of 
photography and art to a particular problematic critical tradition (modernist formalism). Not only is 
this tradition inadequate to the comprehension of nearly all the most significant developments within 
the visual arts over the last fifty years (as well as in the second and third decades of the twentieth 
century); it has also come to function philosophically as the historical ground for the revival of a 
(broadly Kantian) aesthetics of contemporary art, and thereby, the perpetuation of a fundamental 
conflation of ‘aesthetics’ with the philosophy of art (a conflation which, historically, photography 
played a central role in breaking up). A philosophical approach to the concept of photography, and 
its relations to art, thus raises, in the first instance, the question not of an aesthetics of the photo-
graphic, or even ‘aesthetics after photography’, but rather of ‘art after photography’. This is not to say 
that there is no aesthetic dimension to photography (or to contemporary art), but only that it is not 
the criterion of art status. Contemporary art is not aesthetic art, in anything like Kant’s sense. The 
question ‘What, if anything, does digitalization tell us about the nature of photography as an art 
form?’ should thus be reposed, even more generically, as ‘What, if anything, does digitalization tell 
us about the nature of photography in art?’ 
I say ‘the nature of photography in art’, rather than ‘the nature of photography as art’, since the 
latter in no way exhausts the former. Photography plays an important role in contemporary art beyond 
what we may call photographic art, or what others might still want to call ‘art photography’ – as an 
element or component of a wide variety of different kinds of installation work, for example. One of the 
most important, unresolved critical questions of the day concerns the relationship between these dif-
ferent kinds of practice: that is, whether they can be subjected to a single overarching critical problem-
atic; and what the consequences are for the concept of art if they cannot. ‘Art’ is therefore a 
fundamentally bifurcated field, in which two quite different sets of critical conditions apply – as has 
been suggested recently by Jeff Wall. The critical contest here is one between a conception of photog-
raphy as a pictorial medium and a conception of photography in art as the domain of the image in 
general (Wall 2007; Osborne and Wall 2008).
In posing the philosophical question of photography in this way – ‘What, if anything, does digi-
talization tell us about the nature of photography in art?’ – my aim is to reposition the question of 
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photography’s relation to contemporary art within a different critical history of contemporary art. 
This is a history that is less centred on mediums, their multiplication, problematization and revival 
(the current, belated second coming of medium-specific modernism; the hallelujah chorus of the 
revival of ‘aesthetics’ as a philosophical discipline) and more centred on mediums, their multiplica-
tion, problematization and the definitive destruction of their ontological significance for art, by the 
combination of performance, minimalist, conceptual and other related practices of the 1960s (of 
which photography was a crucial constitutive part). Those practices changed the status and thereby 
the character of the traditional ‘arts’ of painting and sculpture, and also – one must presume – 
photography. This is a critical history that gives rise to a broad ontological characterization of con-
temporary art as a post-conceptual art. 
The paradox here is that photography only gained generalized institutional recognition as an artis-
tic practice after the destruction of the ontological significance of medium in the 1960s – a destruction 
to which photography made a distinctive contribution, primarily via its roles in the documentation of 
performance and within conceptual art practice. Photography thus became a part of ‘art’ at the moment 
that ‘art’ became post-conceptual. In this respect, one might say – contra Jeff Wall – that photography 
is art to the extent to which it is itself a post-conceptual practice.
Digitalization and the real (or, anxiety about abstraction)
There is an ambiguity in the formulation ‘photography after digitalization’ which goes to the heart of 
the complexity of the role of photography in contemporary art. It corresponds to the two-fold nature of 
the traditional photographic process. For the phrase can be understood to refer to (1) the digitalization 
of the act of photographic capture, in the sense of the translation of the distribution of intensities of light 
on the sensor into the binary code of the data file, within the digital camera, in the ‘taking’ of a photo-
graph – the photographic ‘event’; and (ii) the digital condition of the production of an image from a data 
file, the so-called ‘digital image’ (although the image itself – qua image – is not digital, of course, since 
the image is a visually structured abstraction of elements of the physical process). These two processes 
are disjunctive and hence potentially separable, since the data from which a digital image is produced 
need not be the result of photographic capture, and so the so-called digital image is therefore not nec-
essarily photographic. It is the disjunction between these two processes that raises the possibility of the 
manipulation and transformation of ‘photographic’ data, subsequent to the taking of a picture, prior to 
its projection as an image – that is, computerized image processing. And it is this possibility that gener-
ates ontological concern – anxiety – about the ‘no longer indexical’ character of digital photographs.
There are a number of things to be said about this. The first is that the former of these two proc-
esses (the digitalization of the act of photographic capture) retains both the causal and deictic aspects 
of photographic indexicality – and hence its crucial function of grounding reproducibility – but 
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without the iconic aspect of perceptual resemblance previously associated with them.1 As Walter 
Benjamin showed, however, the key to the icon is not perceptual resemblance as such, but repro-
ducibility: the semiotic replicability of the pictorial image is grounded in its means of reproduction 
(a ‘rule of construction’ (Pierce) derived from a law of production) (Osborne 2000: 40). The onto-
logical anxiety about the real generated by digital photography is in this respect misplaced. It 
derives, rather, from the disjunction between the two stages of the photographic process. Yet this 
disjunction is also a feature of traditional chemical photography, in the disjunction between the 
negative and the print – each, in principle, as open to manipulation as a digital data file. Thus the 
difference does not concern the possibility of manipulation, per se, but rather its precise character 
and quality; in particular, the extraordinary ‘fine grain’ manipulation that becomes possible at the 
level of the pixel, which can be performed in such a way as to leave no visible trace – relative to 
visual expectations governed by conventions of photographic realism. Nonetheless, artists (and 
others) have been intervening in the mechanisms of the photographic process since its inception, 
without generating the ontological anxiety about the loss of the real (loss of indexicality) that has 
accompanied the advent of digital photography. So, one must think, perhaps something else is 
going on here?
This anxiety appears irrational – which is, of course, no more than to acknowledge it as an anxi-
ety: a free-floating anxiousness about the real that has ‘latched on’ to digital photography as a cul-
tural site in which to invest, because of the social importance but current uncertainty about the 
various documentary functions of photography. The basic source of such anxiety has nothing to do 
with photography itself. Rather, I would speculate, it has to do with the nature of the abstraction of 
social relations characteristic of societies based on relations of exchange; and, in particular, the rela-
tionship between social form and the value form (in Marx’s sense) – that peculiar sense in which, in 
the parlance of current journalistic commentary, the most decisive sectors of the capitalist economy, 
associated with finance capital, are not ‘real’. In late autumn 2008, the media incessantly repeated the 
message that the world financial crisis had started to feed through into the ‘real’ economy. There 
was, and is, something ontologically peculiar about this. For it is precisely the most real part of the 
economy – in the sense of being the most determinative – finance capital, which is declared ‘unreal’ 
here. The troubling thing is that in societies based on generalized exchange, certain kinds of abstrac-
tion (money being the most famous example) are in fact real or actual in a manner that does not 
correspond to the ontology of empirical realism that governs ordinary- language use of the term 
‘real’ – hence the disjunction between the actually very ‘real’ economy of finance capital and every-
day individual perceptions of the ‘real’ economy. This is the famously ‘spectral’ or inverted ontology 
of value familiar to readers of Marx’s Capital for well over 100 years now. The reason that I raise it 
here is that, I propose, it is anxiety about the real generated by these peculiar social forms (within 
which the most real appears unreal, and the apparently or empirically real has little determinative 
1.  I take David Green and 
Joanna Lowry’s point 
here about the 
neglected importance 
of the deictic side of 
this: the importance of 
the manner of pointing 
to the event of 
inscription – ostension 
as a constitutive, 
performative feature of 
photographic 
indexicality. Green and 
Lowry 2003.
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significance) that is displaced onto and invested in the problem of the referential significance of digit-
ally produced images. The fact that there is, in principle, no necessary visible indicator of the referen-
tial value of such an image mimics the structure of the commodity, in which there is no necessary 
relation between use-value and exchange-value.
Philosophically, then, I propose, there is no particular ontological problem posed by digital 
picture taking. There is, rather, a set of normative issues about the conventions governing the 
processing of data in the interval between its ‘capture’ and its projection or printing, under techno-
logical conditions facilitating a generalized manipulation of the components of images. This de-
coupling of the photographic image from its indexical ground (which remains at the outset) has a 
particular significance in the context of art, since art has been understood, philosophically, since 
early German romanticism as a form of self-conscious illusion. Might it not be the growing self-
consciousness of the potentially illusory character of the photographic image, subsequent to its 
digitalization, that makes it the form of image most appropriate to art as self-conscious illusion? 
And is there not thus a strange convergence here, actualized in the digital image, between art and 
the commodity form? 
The visible, the invisible and the multiplication of visualizations
Insofar as there is an ontological peculiarity or novelty at issue here, it attaches to the digital image 
per se, and not just the ‘photographically’ generated one – although most digitally produced images 
are, as a matter of empirical fact, photographically based, in one way or another. It derives from the 
lack of visual ‘resemblance’ between digital data and the projected or printed form of the image it 
generates. Insofar as it makes any sense to talk of a digitally produced image as some kind of ‘copy’ 
of the data out of which it is made, it is a visible copy of an invisible original, since it is the digital data 
that plays the role of the original here, rather than the situation or event that is depicted, which is its 
more distant, shadowy source. This is quite different from the role of the negative as the mediator 
between the act of photographic capture and the print. The contiguity of these two processes is rup-
tured by the ontological peculiarity, or self-sufficiency, of digitalized data. On the other hand, how-
ever, we might see this as little more than a variation (albeit also an intensification) of the essentially 
theological character of the traditionally chemical-based photographic image itself. 
As Boris Groys has pointed out, insofar as a digital image is a visible copy of an invisible original, 
‘the digital image is functioning as a Byzantine icon – as a visible copy of invisible God’ (Groys 2008: 
84). Groys, however, appears to take this theological structure to be distinctive of digital imagery. Yet 
this is something it shares with the traditional photograph in a different form (Osborne 2000: 34–35). 
What is distinctive about the digitally produced image is that it exhibits something like a de-temporal-
ization of the theological structure of the photograph, consequent upon its rupture in the continuity 
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between the two stages of the photographic process. Its decisive difference lies in the attention it calls 
to the multiplication of varieties of forms of visualization made possible by that rupture, within the 
parameters of what are still, essentially, processes of replication.
In Barthes’ famous account in Camera Lucida, the temporal peculiarity of the photograph (as the 
literal presence of the past) is understood to effect an ‘immobilization’ and ‘engorgement’ of time 
(Barthes 1984: 91). This represents a naturalization of the theological structure of the icon, via time, 
because meaning participates in the real through the becoming ‘carnal’ of light. In the digital image, 
on the other hand, time is not immobilized or engorged so much as obliterated, insofar as any 
ontological significance of the physical contiguity of digital data is negated by the rupture in its visual 
form: its translation into binary code. It is this rupture that allows Groys to figure digital data as ‘invis-
ible’ and hence metaphorically God-like. But it is not just invisibility that figures divinity in this account 
of the digital image but, ultimately more importantly, the creative potential of digitalized data to gener-
ate an in-principle-infinite multiplicity of forms of visualizations; although Groys does not quite put it 
like this himself, since he is primarily concerned with the mediating role of the curator as ‘the per-
former of the image’ (Groys 2008: 85), rather than the infinite potentiality of the data that underlies 
this role. (For Groys, it is digitalization that allows the curator to usurp the role of the artist.) 
Invisibility and the multiplication of visualizations are linked insofar as, following the line of 
thought of iconoclastic religions, it is precisely the multiplicity of visualizations that sustains the 
invisibility of the invisible; since, were the invisible to be associated with a single, or even a few stable 
visible forms, the invisible would become identified with them, and would henceforth be rendered 
visible after all. It is thus the multiplication of possible forms of visualization/projection (screen, mon-
itor, wall, etc.) deriving from the generic power of digitalization to free itself from any particular 
medium that, ultimately, distinguishes the digital image from its chemically photographic predeces-
sor. And it is this multiplication of possible forms of visualization/projection that allows Groys to 
claim that, although the digital image remains in some sense a copy (a copy of its data), each ‘event 
of its visualization is an original event’ (Groys 2008: 90). So here we have the ‘event’ again: not the 
event of photographic capture, but the event of visualization. Originality thus migrates, or at least, is 
doubled: moving from what it is that is copied (now, the data) to the form of the copy. This has sig-
nificant consequences for art practice, as well as for curation. 
With regard to photography, though, we can say that the main function of digitalization is to place 
photography within the generic field of the digital image. This generically digital-based field is the clos-
est thing there is to a material medium of the generic concept of ‘art’, characteristic of the post-concep-
tual artistic field. Indeed, one might go as far as to propose that the unity of the field of contemporary 
art is secured (internally to its institutionality, which sets its ultimate, social parameters) by the possibil-
ity of the digitally mediated re-presentation of works. (Digital imagery, one might say, plays the role 
projected for language – but which language could not play – within analytical conceptual art.)
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This is not a ‘dematerialization’ of art (or photography), however – always a misunderstanding of 
art’s conceptual character – but a materially specific medium of generation of an in-principle-infinite 
field of visualizations (the data file). If there is a meaningful site of ‘dematerialization’ at stake here, it 
does not lie in the data file, nor in the conceptual dimension of the work (the originally postulated site 
of dematerialization) – which is actually always tied to specific materializations – but rather (ironically) 
in the image itself, insofar as the image is the name for the perceptual abstraction of a visual structure 
from its material form. Via the multiplicity of visualizations, digitalization draws attention to the essen-
tially de-realized character of the image. It is this de-realized image – supported in each instance by 
specific material processes – that strangely ‘corresponds’ to the ontological status of the value-form. 
The return to medium – medium as a reactive response to an anxiety of its own (anxiety about the end 
of mediums as ‘arts’, as a discrete version of anxiety about the real more generally), or, we might say, 
medium as a mode of passive nihilism in art – is the dialectical counterpart to this de-realization of the 
image. De- (and therefore potentially re-) realized images may be infinitely exchanged. This is the 
social meaning of the ontology of the digital image, of which photography is now but one (albeit cru-
cial) kind. In the digital image, the infinity of exchange made possible by the abstraction of value from 
use finds an equivalent visual form.
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